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This article reviews the existing literature on SWFs and the firm, focusing particular attention 
on the implications of the rise of SWFs strategic agility and HRM. This paper outlines three 
main channels through which sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment has implications for 
employees.  First, SWFs influence macroeconomic environments, and hence affect labor 
conditions.  Second, institutional conditions in different countries shape the behavior of 
SWFs around the world, which in turn has implications for HR strategy and practice. Fourth, 
SWFs can have a direct effect on the corporate governance and hence HR strategies and 
employees of organizations in which they invest. We review and discuss these three channels 
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 It is widely accepted that external stakeholders and business conditions can affect both 
the strategic capabilities of firms and their HR practices (Ulrich & Dulebohn, 2015; Wood & 
Wright, 2009).  However, despite growing interest in how new investor categories may 
impact on the capabilities and strategic agility of firms (Weber & Tarba, 2010, 2014; Weber 
& Fried, 2011), and their people (Wood & Wright, 2009), prior work has not fully considered 
how new investor categories may impact on strategic agility and HR management.   Although 
strategic agility is seen as an increasingly desirable organizational characteristic, much of the 
literature on the subject focuses on the technological base of strategic agility or sees investors 
as posing challenges or constraints on agility, rather than enabling it (c.f. Young-Ybarrra & 
Wiersma, 1999; Sherihy et al. 2007; Shafer & Ericksen, 2001). Yet, new investor categories 
can provide much needed new sources of capital to invest in physical or human assets; they 
may also drive new managerial directions, with beneficial or adverse consequences for 
people (Appelbaum et al., 2013; Clark, 2007; Goergen et al., 2014). Looking at the case of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), this paper reviews existing evidence on the impact of 
SWFs on a firm’s people, and its ability to alter its HR strategies in an agile fashion in 
diverse organizational and institutional contexts.  In other words, we explore the relationship 
between an increasingly important ‘new’ investor category, intra-organizational HR strategy 
and practice, and the implications for strategic agility.  This builds a growing body of work 
that links prevailing institutional regimes and sources of firm finance to dominant HRM 
models within and between national contexts (Tuselman et al. 2015; Brewster et al., 2007; 
2012; Kalmi et al, 2005; Appelbaum et al., 2013).  As such, it seeks both to advance our 
understanding on the implications of the activities of new financial actors for HRM, and our 
understanding of strategic agility through shedding further light on its HR foundations.    
  SWFs are state-owned and controlled investment organizations that grow in 
importance both in developed and emerging economies. These funds are used by countries 
with large foreign exchange reserves to get better returns (Gospel et al., 2011), to stabilize the 
country when it faces external economic shocks, to diversify revenues, as a form of inter-
generational saving (Balin 2010:1; Jory et al. 2010:597), and/or as a means of political 
leverage (Dixon & Monk 2012:104; Bertoni & Lugo 2014); whatever their rationales, it is 
likely that their investment choices will have some impact on the strategies of target 
organizations and their employees (Gospel et al., 2011). Most SWFs center on oil, gas and 
mining, with the exception of some Asian exporting nations, most notably China (Caner & 
Grennes, 2010) and Singapore. SWFs may also seek to mitigate the effects of the “Dutch 
disease” through reducing dependence of resource revenues, diluting dependence on non-
renewable assets (Chwieroth, 2014). SWFs have become increasingly prominent, and are 
quite large when compared to other types of institutional investors (Caner & Grennes 2010), 
despite recent  drawdowns following a spell of relatively low oil prices.  Although there is 
much debate surrounding the work and employment effects of other new financial actors 
(Appelbaum et al., 2013; Clark, 2007; Goergen et al., 2014), SWFs have, to date, managed to 
avoid a great deal of the controversies in this area, that have, for example, embroiled the 
private equity industry (c.f. Appelbaum et al., 2013).  According to the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute’s (2014) estimates, SWF holdings reached some 6.8 trillion USD by 2014, 
with 59.5% stemming from oil and gas related revenues. It ranks Norway as the largest SWF 
followed by the UAE.  
  Whilst accounts rooted in the economics and finance literature have characterized 
SWFs primarily as another source of capital for financial intermediaries and other seekers of 
investment capital (Megginson et al. 2013; Sa & Viani 2013), others have depicted them as 
essentially political actors whose rise has far reaching implications for governments and 
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firms (Cohen, 2009; Fernandes, 2014), and, indeed, their people (Gospel & Pendleton 2014a, 
2014b). Accounting for one eight of global investment, SWFs are reshaping the global 
economy by transferring increasingly large levers of economic power and influence to the 
central authority of the state (Bremmer, 2010). But rather than a regulator of market 
activities, this new form of statism has been described as a system in which the state “plays 
the role of leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain” or supports 
key inside economic intersts, rather one that mediates the excesses of markets in the interests 
of society at large (Bremmer 2010:29-30); others have argued that SWFs occupy a space that 
straddles both state and market (Wood & Wright, 2015), with implication for firm strategic 
performance and employees that may be beneficial or negative (Gospel & Pendleton 2014a; 
2014b; Haberly, 2013). Naturally, this has raised critical debate regarding the political 
influence of SWFs on global markets, organizational behavior and HRM, particularly since 
the redistribution of economic power to emerging economies challenges Western dominance 
of global capital flows (ibid.). 
 Clearly, the rise of SWFs as an investor category has important implications for the 
firm. However, whilst there is much work on the volume and destinations of SWF activities, 
the body of work on their implications for the strategic agility and capabilities of 
organizations and their people is rather fragmented.  However, it can be argued that a key 
dimension of SWF activity is related to their impact on employment and labor relations both 
in their host and home economies. This impact may happen on multiple levels, including 
labor dynamics in SWFs’ portfolio companies and macro-economic consequences of SWF 
investment in specific sectors and countries. At present, there is no comprehensive academic 
research focused on this particular aspect of SWFs, and this paper aims to address these 
conceptual and empirical gaps. More specifically, in this paper, we are focused on the 
implications of SWF investment for HRM, according particular attention to strategic agility.  
We identify three main channels through which SWFs may impact firm capabilities and 
employees: (1) SWFs affect macroeconomic environments and thereby labor conditions; (2) 
different institutional conditions shape the behavior of SWFs, which has implications for 
managers and employees; (3) SWFs affect corporate governance practices and hence HR 
policies. We describe each of these channels in this paper, discuss related research, and 
identify avenues for future research. 
 
2. Defining Strategic Agility 
 Doz and Kosonen (2010) argue that there are three elements of strategic agility: 
sensitivity, leadership agility and resources.  Sensitivity may be defined as an awareness of 
relevant issues, leadership agility represents the internal ability to adjust the business 
according in line with decisions, and resources fluidity indicates the ability to reconfigure and 
bring resources to bear in support of decisions (Doz & Kosonen 2008; c.f. Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009). Vecchiato (2015) argues that strategic agility simply represents the ability 
of organizations to respond rapidly to changes in external circumstances.  Boxall (1998:265) 
defines strategic agility in terms of HR, as comprising “specific cognitive abilities, behavioral 
characteristics, and contextual conditions”, and it is this framework that is deployed in the 
main body of this paper.   Weber and Tarba (2014:7) define strategic agility as “the ability of 
management to constantly and rapidly sense and respond to a changing environment by 
intentionally making strategic moves and consequently adapting the necessary organizational 
configuration for successful implementation”.   Strategic agility is not just about managerial 
leadership, choices and flexibility, but also about internal and external resources (Judge & 
Miller, 1991; Grewal & Thansuhaj, 2001; Junni et al., 2015; Sarker & Sarker, 2009; Weill et 
al., 2002; Wilson & Doz, 2011).  The latter, in turn, represents not only accumulated assets 
and capabilities, but also sufficient room accorded by investors to respond to challenges and 
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opportunities, even if short term returns may be somewhat diminished.  As Piercy (2008) 
notes, financial security has become highly unpredictable, even as markets, technologies, 
availability of raw material are subject to rapid, and, at times, unpredictable change.   It has 
been argued that new investor categories may facilitate, even if they do not guarantee, 
strategic flexibility (Vagadia 2014).   Marx (2008:1) defines “active inertia” as a structural 
lack of agility imposed by external or internal constraints.    
 Central to strategic agility is HRM policy and practice, yet this will be both confined 
and enabled not only managerial choices, but the financial resources available, and the 
expectations of those providing them (c.f. Marx 2008).   The institutional context - and the 
manner in which investors operate within this context - will mold both managerial practices 
and attitudes, and the range of options available to the firm (Shafer & Ericksen, 2001; Dyer 
& Shafer, 1999; Dyer & Ericksen, 2005).   In particular, it will affect the ability of a firm to 
adjust its workforce, the relative ability to invest in technology and people, relative autonomy 
and control, and the ability to cope with unforeseen external shocks (ibid.; c.f. Ireland et al., 
2003).   However, as the literature on institutional complexity alerts us, organizations may be 
subject to competing pressures from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Whilst national institutions are never perfectly aligned or coherent (Lane & Wood, 2009; 
Greenwood et al., 2011), in the case of SWF investments, an additional layer of complexity is 
introduced in that the firm is also subject to institutional pressures from the country of origin 
of the fund. As SWFs are state owned, they are likely to be quite closely aligned to the formal 
and informal state level institutions in their country of origin, which, as we shall see, impart 
quite strong pressures on target firms.  
 Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011) suggest that a further key dimension is financial flexibility 
and the ability to more closely link rewards with organisational performance. Nissen and 
Paauwe (2012: 3315) argue that strategic agility is founded on human resource advantage, 
which in turn reflects “rare value…relative immobility and superior appropriability”.   By 
this it is meant not only skills and flexibility, but the accumulated organization specific 
knowledge and understandings.   Such agility is dependent on corporate governance and 
industry realities (ibid.).  
 Human capital theory assumes that labor is not a homogenous or readily 
interchangeable commodity, that institutions impact both on individual human capital 
development, and that the process of production is linked to wider societal and economic 
forces (Bowles & Gintes, 1975).  At the same time, it has been argued that human capital is 
not like any other type of capital in that it is dynamic, bound up with individual choices, and 
is also affected by how individual capabilities work together in a specific workplace and 
societal context (ibid.; Aoki, 2010).   Lepak and Snell (1999) argue that a key issue is that 
individuals possess knowledge and skills that are variable and of unequal strategic 
performance.   The basic building blocks of human capital are knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSA) (Ballout, 2007). This has been linked to the resource based view of the firm, which 
suggests that each firm’s competitive advantage rests on capabilities that are difficult to 
replicate; the latter encompasses human resources, which may become core competencies 
(Clardy, 2008; Ployhart et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010).  Hence, Aoki (2010) argues that, 
within the firm, individual human capital may, when combined across the workforce lead to a 
set of collective cognitive capabilities, which impart the firm with unique strategic 
advantages.   Accordingly, it has been argued that OB resources are closely bound up with 
human capital resources to provide each firm with a unique set of resources and capabilities 
(Ployhardt, 2015). 
 Consequently, human capital is closely bound up with strategic agility; it is not just 
about individual abilities and behaviors, but also has implications for how sets of individuals 
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work together in a context, and how this may be leveraged to cope with external challenges 
(Boxall, 1998; Aoki, 2010).  At the same time, both human capital and cognitive capabilities 
are very difficult to accurately cost, especially by external investors, who lack insider 
knowledge on the firm (Aoki, 2010; Goergen et al., 2014).  This would suggest that new 
financial actors may systematically undervalue the human capital and cognitive capabilities 
of organizations, and, in doing so, weaken the sum of the organization’s inherent resources, 
and its ability to respond to external challenges in a strategically agile fashion (Aoki, 2010; 
Goergen et al., 2014; c.f. Boxall 1998; Clardy, 2008).   In other words, whilst new investors 
may provide welcome infusions of capital, a lack of insider knowledge may mean that the 
human dimensions of strategic agility are discounted.  
 As the literature on organizational ambidexterity alerts us, firms may attain strategic 
advantage through balancing explorative and exploitative capabilities (Junni et al., 2015).  
Whilst it can be argued that new investor categories who lack insider knowledge may 
undermine the latter, even in challenging external circumstances, there may be room by key 
strata of managers to mitigate such pressures through their adjusting and refining the key 
dimensions of internal capabilities and processes (Meglio et al., 2015; Burgess et al. 2015). 
 
3. Method 
There is a growing body of literature on the effects of new investor categories on HR 
practice, and again, on the consequences of SWF investments (Goergen et al., 2014; 
Appelbaum & Batt, 2013; Megginson et al, 2013).  However, there is much less work that 
links new investor categories to strategic agility, and, indeed, SWFs to HRM (c.f. Gospel & 
Pendleton, 2014a).  In seeking to bridge these different categories of enquiry, through 
bringing together distinct, yet, at times, overlapping bodies of literature, this paper seeks to 
both consolidate the existing base of knowledge, and promote new inter-disciplinary applied 
research, that advances both how we understand strategic ability and HR management in a 
changing world.  Although the study was not a fully systematic literature review, it did follow 
protocols characteristic of a systematic literature review as outlined by Adolphus (2014): 
define search terms; identify databases; decide on filters; and ensure representivity through 
redoing the filtering process. Firstly, we identified the search terms, following email 
discussions among the authorial team. Secondly, we identified a number of key journal 
publishers’ repositories and journal databases, in this case, JSTOR, AB-Inform, Business 
Source Premier, Emerald, Blackwell Synergy, Elsevier, Scopus, TANDF, and Oxford 
Journals. We followed this on with a broader search through Google scholar.   Thirdly, in the 
case of the publishers‘ repositories and databases, we deployed two filters: we filtered out 
articles not categorized in the “social sciences” or “business”, “management” and 
“economics”, and those that were not in recognized peer reviewed journals. We searched for 
the keyword “Sovereign Wealth Fund” in both article titles and abstracts, as we believed this 
would allow the rapid identification of the body of work that treated SWFs as the main object 
of enquiry.  In the case of Google Scholar, we looked for combinations of “Sovereign Wealth 
Fund” and other keywords, namely "sovereign wealth fund" + "employment"/"employment 
relations" / "industrial relations" / "work"/ "labour" / "labour relations" / “human resources 
management”.  As Google Scholar trawls through text, this enabled the more rapid 
identification of relevant work on SWFs that did not feature “Sovereign Wealth Funds” in the 
article title and abstract. This also enabled the capture of books and research reports not 
normally encountered in publishers’ journal repositories. At the same time, the usage of 
different approaches to search for  literature facilitated the grading of accounts according to 
quality (evidenced by peer review and publication by a recognized publisher, or by the 
subjectively appraised quality of the research institution or NGO in the case of un-reviewed 
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reports) and topicality (year of publication).    Fourthly, we repeated our searches with the 
filters of subject area removed from our search of publishers repositories to see if we had 
missed a significant number of articles from our net; no little relevant work came to 
light.   The findings were presented in narrative, rather than tabular form, organized 
thematically and in terms of the nature of the topics covered (c.f. Adolphus 2014).   
Van Tuldor et al. (2003) note that in conducting a literature review, a key dimension 
is the filtering out of extraneous or non-relevant articles. Where we departed from a textbook 
systematic literature review was in terms of the selection of articles to reject from coverage in 
this review. Rather than deploying mechanistic tools (e.g. filtering out papers deploying a 
certain method), we independently reviewed each submission, making subjective judgments 
as to its quality and relevance. On Google Scholar, for example, the keywords “Sovereign 
Wealth Fund” and “Human Resource Management” returned 128 papers, many of which are 
books or manuscripts that do not directly connect the two topics. However, the authors have 
extensive experience of reviewing and editing work, and this, and multiple author evaluation 
of key sources may have reduced the possibility for arbitrary or unfounded exclusions. We 
found 61 relevant and salient papers on SWF activity for the purposes of this paper after the 
filtering process. At the same time, the exclusion of an article should not be taken as a 
negative judgment of an author’s work. Finally, no literature search is ever complete, given 
that articles are constantly being published. We concluded our search in October 2014.  
 
4. SWFs, macroeconomic conditions, and labour outcomes 
 SWFs represent a wide range of investment institutions that are very different in terms 
of their size, investment focus and governance. Table 1 provides an overview of the largest 
SWFs.  
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Insert Table 1 Here >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
  
 As indicated in this table, leading SWFs, although different in size, control significant 
financial assets by volume. With the exception of Norway’s Government Pension Fund 
Global, they are based in emerging market economies. They also differ in terms of their 
maturity, with Kuwait Investment Authority being the oldest one while Russian SWFs have 
been created more recently; it could be argued that longer standing SWFs are more likely to 
be relatively patient, and seek to reap the benefits of proven organizational strategies and 
associated models of people management (Haberly, 2013).  Table 1 also shows that, as a rule, 
SWFs have relatively low levels of transparency. This is a very important characteristic since 
through their investment, SWFs do not only re-balance trade surpluses on an arm’s length 
basis, but incorporate a new governance and power dimension in shaping the global circuit of 
capital, and the consequences of their investments may radically impact on the fortunes of 
target firms and their people. Unlike traditional forms of statism, as cross-border investors 
(Megginson et al., 2013:539) SWF activities transcend national boundaries, challenging the 
soft power of Western developed nations, and promoting new forms of cross-border relations 
encompassing potential cooperation and the sharing of practices between SWFs (Chwieroth, 
2014:10). Indeed, Lenihan (2013:245) argues that they may provide a new form of non-
military rebalancing of the international order, without immediately challenging its 
foundations. Indeed, it could be argued that the rise of SWFs represents actions by net 
exporting nations to deal with the problem of global imbalances, marking the beginning of a 
global shift in power (Alberola & Serena, 2008:330; Chwieroth, 2014:10).   However, such 
accounts focus primarily on the effects of their investments on the wider political economy, 
when it could be argued that more immediate effects will be felt on organizational strategies 
and capabilities, and employees. 
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 As Park and van der Hoorn (2012:211) note, prior to the onset of the financial crisis, 
there was growing concern over the increasing holdings and influence of SWFs in developed 
nations (above all, the United States), but this has receded since the onset of the 2008- 
financial crisis when SWFs became a welcome source of capital. If the response of many 
Western governments to the financial crisis has been to nationalize private debt, the activities 
of SWFs have been to “bring to the public agenda the tools of the money manager” (Datz, 
2009:663). For instance, SWFs from China and the Middle East “bailed out” major U.S. 
financial firms in the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2008 (Jory et al., 2010). While they 
may be an investor of last resort in the case of organizations experiencing severe crisis, 
leading to a clash of interests between the investing country and the host one (ibid.). Thus, it 
is feared that SWFs might capture strategic industries, following the rationale of politics, 
rather than the market   (Datz, 2009:663); in other words, it could be argued that the primary 
aim of many SWF investments has little to do with profits, meaning that strategic capabilities 
and people may only be treated as incidentals.   
 This growing significance of SWFs on macro-economic level translated into 
potentially material effects on strategy and people in targeted companies, including 
employment dynamics in portfolio companies, institutional characteristics and the very fabric 
of labor relations.  As such, even if an SWF does not have explicit goals or objectives 
regarding labour-related issues, SWF investment behavior is nevertheless likely to have 
significant impact on labour issues through their influence on macroeconomic conditions in 
two main ways.  
 First, SWFs may smoothen the effects of economic cycles and support employment 
growth (Jory et al., 2010:591). In their role as investors of last resort, they may inject much 
needed capital into firms facing difficulties, and, hence, help safeguard jobs (ibid.); they may 
alleviate contextual pressures, enabling firms to build their strategic agility through being 
able to accord more attention to developing their internal capabilities. Nor is this role 
confined to investments abroad. SWFs can also provide a source of finance to enable states to 
cushion employees from the effects of economic downturn. Teague and Donaghey (2003) 
highlight the role of the Finnish buffer zone fund in enabling employment relations 
institutions to adapt to economic shocks and soften potential blows to labour. Raymond 
(2010:121) found that after the financial crisis, a number of SWFs directed the investment 
focus to their country of origin to fulfill this role. Moreover, investments in domestic banks 
may preclude a freezing of credit, in turn bolstering non-financial firms (Raymond, 
2010:128). However, a lack of transparency may lead to investments following on personal 
networks, prejudicing better run firms and their people (Bernstein et al., 2013: 220). At the 
same time, there appears to have been a move away from high risk companies, which, in turn, 
may diminish their investor of last resort status (ibid.). This may make their role in providing 
support for firms lacking agility that would otherwise have failed less central (and, hence, 
contributing to the safeguarding of jobs in countries of domicile).  
 Second, SWFs may sustain trade imbalances, finance the debt of Western economies 
and thereby support their labour markets, through propping up service sectors. The United 
States and the United Kingdom represent by far the largest targets for SWF investment (Jory 
et al., 2012:600); it is no coincidence that these are lightly regulated, Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al., 2007). Of course, as such 
economies tend to be net importers, inflows via SWFs may, help prop up global imbalances 
in trade and consumption, and re-inflate asset price bubbles (Lenihan, 2013:228). In practice, 
this may help offset pressures on such economies to confront structural imbalances, which 
would include a long term shrinkage of good jobs and, hence, non-debt-based consumer 
demand (c.f. United Nations, 2013). The primary area of job expansion in the liberal market 
economies has been in low end service sector work (Wright & Dwyer, 2003). In propping the 
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system up, SWF investments may have the indirect effect of artificially sustaining large 
numbers of organizations geared to servicing debt fuelled consumer demand on a low cost 
basis; such firms will lack the internal dimensions of strategic agility, and be associated with 
low value added instrumentalist HR policies (Cohen, 2009).  Conversely, investments aimed 
at securing technology and capabilities may lead to target organizations reduced to a rump, 
with much production outsourced to the fund’s country of origin, and, potentially, 
knowledge-stripping through the capture of proprietary technologies and expertise (Cohen 
2009:718; Wojcik, 2012; Meyer et al., 2014).   In other words, rather than technology 
providing the basis of agility and renewal, the capture of technology by external investors 
may emasculate firms, with their people being treated as a disposable commodity, once they 
have served their purpose.   In HR terms, it has, as noted above, been argued that strategic 
agility is founded on context, behaviors and capabilities (Boxall, 1998); in the following 
sections, we place the activities of SWFs in terms of each of these three dimensions.    
 
5. Contextual Circumstances: SWFs, home and host country institutions 
As Boxall (1998) notes, a significant proportion of strategic agility through HR is 
conferred by contextual circumstances. The impact of SWF investments on the firm is 
mediated by institutional context. SWFs, like any other multi-national companies, operate 
across national borders by investing in companies and other funds located in different 
institutional environments. Institutional theorists argue that legitimacy judgments are made in 
“action spaces” where individual entities interact socially, but the process of interaction is 
affected by various, often overlapping external factors, such as rules-in-use, attributes of the 
community and physical conditions (e.g., physical distance between the actors), in line with 
the “institutional polycentrism” framework (Ostrom and Basurto 2011). A number of macro-
institutional theorists have developed these ideas further by suggesting the characteristics of 
institutional environments includes multiplicity, which scholars have defined as the 
confluence of different types of interrelated institutions (Batjargal et al. 2013; Holmes et al. 
2013). As Batjargal et al. (2013: 2013) argue: “The confluence of multiple institutions is 
theorized to have qualitatively different effects on outcomes than a single institution or 
several institutions, because the confluence is characterized by dynamic interaction, mutual 
reinforcement, and a cointegrated and nonseparable nature of diverse institutional rules and 
norms within the entire institutional order.” These authors focus on the confluence of 
regulatory, normative and socio-cognitive macro-institutions or “first-order” social boundary 
conditions (Kraatz & Block 2008), which, in turn, hinge upon the cultural and historic 
developments in particular countries (see Holmes et al. 2013, for a detailed discussion).   
Recent advances in institutional complexity theory develop the notion of conditioned action 
to suggest that actions are structurally conditioned by historically embedded institutional 
arrangements (Delbridge and Edwards 2013). New actors from abroad are less deeply 
embedded within such arrangements, with their actions potentially reinforcing existing ways 
of doing things, through forming alliances with local investors in order to capitalise on 
known complementarities reaped by the latter, or disrupting them, through being driven by 
the institutional logics of their country of origin (c.f. Morgan & Kristensen, 2006).  
Therefore, SWFs focused on global portfolio diversification face a challenge of 
balancing between various types of legitimacy judgments that include, in addition to 
instrumental (pragmatic), also relational and moral dimensions (Bell et al. 2014; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen 2013; Tost 2011). Institutional theory does not deny that there are regulative, 
normative and cognitive pressures on funds to compete for resources on the basis of 
economic efficiency. However, it also suggests that SWFs have to conform to expected social 
behavior and demands of a wider body of stakeholders. As Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013: 470) 
summarize this approach: “A major underlying assumption within an “overarching” neo-
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institutional perspective is that the actors are not only competing for resources (“efficiency”), 
but they are also seeking ultimate legitimacy and social acceptance (“legitimation”)”. In other 
words, the ability of SWFs to achieve political and social acceptance will depend, in addition 
to efficiency concerns, on their ability to demonstrate moral and relational responsibility by 
committing to stewardship management practices, stakeholders’ interests including 
employees of their portfolio firms, and societal expectations in general.   
 Although research on “institutions – pressure – firm” triplet (e.g., Eesley & Lenox 
2006) suggests that legitimacy concerns should be a feature of any organization, these 
arguments may be particularly relevant for the SWFs who may suffer from “legitimacy 
deficit” associated with their strong government links. As we indicated above, governments 
as co-owners may attempt to set the non-financial goals to SWFs and their investee firms to 
capture “political benefit of control” at expense of other, private investors (Pistor & Hutton 
2011; Rose 2009). Therefore, gaining legitimacy both in home and host economies is critical 
for a SWF both in terms of gaining entry into a specific market or industry segment and for 
securing its longer term viability.   In other words, SWFs may be less concerned with 
organizational disruption or promoting agility, and more with establishing credentials as a 
patient investor, supporting continuity. 
 As Cohen (2009: 713) notes, many SWF’s originate in contexts where there is a close 
juxtaposition of politics and business. In political terms, SWFs may increase state influence 
and clout, but may also be a form of resistance, protecting weak political mandates and/or 
limiting external interference (Dixon & Monk 2012: 108). A good example of the latter are 
the Asian SWFs, with the range of tools open extending from the husbanding of foreign 
exchange to the investment in the economies of more powerful states (ibid.). 
These arguments suggests a number of important institutional mechanisms that link 
SWFs and labour relations depending on a complex interface of institutional settings in their 
home and host countries. On one hand, there may be institutional pressures coming from 
domestic government and local business elites to promote employment and economic 
development locally, and this may have a profound impact on investment strategy of SWFs 
exposed to these pressures. An example may be Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development 
Company, a SWF that made substantial contribution to the development of local aerospace 
industry through foreign strategic investments and alliances that now supplies components to 
EADS. On the other hand, a SWF may have an explicit mandate from the government to 
secure access to foreign resources, such as China Investment Corporation. Chinese authorities 
are generally hostile towards unionized labour outside tightly controlled and government-
sponsored “official” trade unions. Therefore, SWFs from China and other emerging 
economies may succumb to institutional pressures associated with home country norms and 
regulations and become more hostile to organized labour in their portfolio firms. This may 
lead to harder line HR policies, rather than more affirmative and cooperative HR policies 
associated with human advantage approaches to agility (Nijssen & Paauwe, 2012; Hillman et 
al., 2004). 
 Concerns about political investment motives has led to many countries enacting laws 
to regulate incoming foreign investments, especially in strategic industries, in attempt to 
recalibrate “the great tradeoff” (Cohen, 2009: 722), pushing back on the efforts of capital 
exporting nations to have a greater and more active say as to where their money goes, in a 
process characterized as financial protectionism (Sun et al., 2014: 655). There is evidence of 
growing importance of global institutions such as UN’s Global Compact and the 
institutionalization process of codes of conduct for SWFs and their subsidiaries such as the 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for SWFs (also known as Santiago Principles). 
The 2008 Santiago principles - to which most SWF’s have signed up - commit SWFs to base 
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their investments on “economic and financial grounds” (Park and van der Hoorn 2012: 218), 
but, of course, the latter is open to a great deal of interpretation.   
The importance of host country institutions suggests that local institutional pressures 
may also have far-reaching implications for corporate governance of SWFs. The fund’s quest 
for moral and relational legitimacy may lead to changes in its corporate governance practices 
and processes. By responding to these institutional pressures, SWFs, in addition to enhancing 
monitoring capacity of their investment boards, may also incorporate stakeholder engagement 
mechanisms into their formal governance structures by assigning responsibility for 
sustainability to the board and forming a separate board committee for sustainability. For 
example, Vasudeva (2013) describes how by instituting the Council on Ethics which publicly  
“censors” and “certifies” the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund’s cross-border investments, 
the Norwegian government contributes to the professionalization of responsible investment 
principles. Moreover, this facilitates an institutionalized process of “spill-over” of responsible 
investment practices by other Norwegian firms. A system of remuneration that involves not 
only financial performance benchmarks but also factors associated with longer-term 
sustainability may be another governance factor contributing to moral legitimacy of the fund. 
Following the example of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund, other SWFs which are 
exposed to similar institutional pressures may introduce wider performance criteria and 
definitions of risk in their risk-movement systems that use non-financial indicators. 
Therefore, unlike studies in finance and economics fields, institutional framework suggests to 
consider corporate governance of SWFs as endogenous, socially embedded mechanism that 
may be highly responsive to various institutional pressures.   This would suggest that rather 
than a provider of liquidity facilitating the adoption of more innovative practices, SWFs may 
impose in the portfolio firm’s practices that are not necessarily bound up with the exigencies 
of short term profitability, or facilitating more effective or agile strategies.  This leads to our 
first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Significant SWF investments may promote a longer term view in firms, 
deepening the basis of strategic agility. 
&8& 
6. SWFs impact on firm governance: Country of Origin Impact  
 Boxall (1998) argues, that in HR terms, the second dimension of strategic agility is 
behavioral issues; SWFs more directly influence OB and HR through their direct influence in 
the corporate governance mechanisms of companies in which they invest, through infusing 
new, or reinforcing old, norms and values from their country of origin. Global norms expose 
SWFs to what Bell et al. (2014) call “multiple institutional logics”, and it is unclear how this 
exposure affects legitimation process and its implications for governance and HR policies of 
the firms SWFs invest in.  In the context of “multiple institutional logics” the SWFs face 
heterogeneous and often ambiguous institutional pressures, and previously accepted 
standards of behavior, such as legal rules or self-regulation principles, become fragmented or 
outright ineffective. This may explain the growing heterogeneity of firm-level approaches to 
corporate governance and HR practice despite a growing trend for harmonization through 
various governance codes and principles of “good practice”.  
 In addition to the institutional diversity in their home countries, SWFs face significant 
differences in terms of institutional conditions in their host countries. Institutional theorists 
have identified a wide range of institutional logic, or the “socially constructed historical 
pattern of material practice, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
reproduce their material subsistence.... and provide meaning to life” (Thornton and Ocasio 
1999: 804).  
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 Devinney et al. (2013), for example, argue that in LMEs, the institutional logic of 
“shareholder supremacy” suggests that directors’ and managers’ obligations are mainly to the 
company and its shareholders. However, in stakeholder-oriented Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs), such as Germany, Scandinavian countries and Japan, managers and 
shareholders have to consider multiple stakeholder constituencies when making decisions 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al., 2007).   The comparative capitalisms strand of 
institutional analysis links national institutions, dominant corporate governance regime, with 
internal organizational practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).   What is argued is that national 
level institutions nurture and engender sets of formal and informal rules and associated 
relationships; in CMEs, these tend to be denser or ‘thicker’, with stronger embedded 
stakeholder rights. Within organizations, embedded and systemically sustained patterns of 
behavior underpin mutual interdependence, empowerment and delegation (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Whitley 1999).   It has often been argued that new investor categories will drive a more 
arm’s length and transactional approaches both intra-organizational and external 
relationships, driving firms towards an ever more extreme versions of the calculative HR 
paradigms widely encountered in LMEs (Doz & Kosonen, 2010).   An ability to rapidly 
adjust workforce sizes may enable quick responses to external challenges, but this may 
undermine the behavioral – and capabilities – dimensions of strategic agility (Doz & 
Kosonen, 2010). 
As a result, differences in host country institutional logics suggest that HR practice 
should be of concern for SWFs targeting economies where stakeholder-oriented corporate 
models are particularly prominent. To conform to pressures for relational/moral legitimacy, 
SWFs operating in these countries have to develop and actively pursue a set of longer-term 
objectives geared towards organizational sustainability, as opposed to short-term financial 
performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013). This tips the balance towards a heavier reliance 
on “strategic” controls and the associated governance mechanisms. As Filatotchev and 
Nakajima (2014) explain, “strategic“ controls are more likely to be associated with pro-active 
CSR policies in general, and labour relations in particular, that go beyond compliance issues. 
 Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) note that organizations ‘seek to establish congruence 
between the social values associated with their activities…and the norms of acceptable 
behavior of the society of which they are a part’.  In doing so, they legitimize their actions, 
making it easier for new direction to win broad acceptance: all firms must heed to some 
extent how their actions will be perceived, and hence, legitimacy is closely bound up with 
strategic agility (Boxall & Purcell, 1997).  A third source of norms of acceptable behavior 
may be diffused by an investor from abroad, based on what is acceptable in its country of 
origin.   In case where country of origin ethical standards are high, this may constrain firms 
from responding quite so rapidly to changes in contextual circumstances, but it may also 
mean, that, in pioneering better behavior, the chances of costly reputational scandals is less.  
Where they are low, the opposite will the case: greater short- term agility, but greater risk of 
reputational scandals down the line. 
 Hence, in line with the institutional arguments above, SWF practices “tend to reflect 
their national norms of governance” (Aizenman & Glick, 2009:383). SWFs may affect labour 
through contributing to the diffusion of norms of their home countries (Vasudeva, 2013). As 
suggested by Gospel et al. (2011), there may be a link between SWF country of origin and 
HR policies in target organizations. Similarly, Kotter and Lei (2011) suggest that parent 
country effects and the manner in which the SWF is governed are likely to impact 
organizational behavior in target firms. For instance, the Norwegian State Pension Fund 
seeks to promote Norwegian values such as human rights, fairness and labour standards, 
while practicing transparency and democratic oversight over its investment. It explicitly 
engages companies on issues of working conditions and child labour, and divests from 
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companies violating such principles as part of its responsible investment policy. Vasudeva 
(2013) found that this exerts normative pressures on home country firm’s cross-border 
investment decisions. In contrast, home country norms may also negatively affect labour 
policies. As most SWFs originate in authoritarian countries, they may be hostile to organized 
labour, and drive more hardline HR policies (Gospel et al., 2011: 281).    This may impart 
greater flexibility to adjust HR policies in dealing with external challenges, but may also 
impose costs, as will become apparent.  This leads to our second proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Institutional arrangements in SWF countries of origin will adjust the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour within the firm: this may short up or undermine the 
human resource basis of strategic agility. 
 
7. SWF and Firm Governance: Cognitive Capabilities Issues 
 Boxall (1998) argues that the third dimension of strategic agility in HR terms is 
cognitive abilities; we deploy the term ‘cognitive capabilities’ to encompass the combined 
capabilities of a workforce as a whole, both in terms of the sum of individual capabilities and 
synergies between them (Aoki, 2010).  Questions arise over the nature of governance: if the 
owners use their influence, business decision become political, and if not, this strengthens the 
hand of managers compared to firms where there is no SWF holding (Caner & Grennes 
2010).  As SWFs have traditionally had long-term objectives (Park & van der Hoorn, 2012), 
this may dilute the pressures on target organizations towards excessive short-termism and the 
type of agility founded on insecurity of labour and high staff turnovers.   In turn, this may, as 
noted above, lead to a discounting of the value of a firm’s accumulated cognitive capabilities 
(c.f. Aoki, 2010).    The latter embodies not just synergies between the human capital of 
individual employees, but also accumulated knowledge and wisdom; the loss of such 
capabilities may impart short-term flexibility, but may hence undermine future strategic 
agility. 
 Conversely, Knill et al. (2012) argue that the mediocre performance of SWFs may 
reflect not simply poor investment choices, but rather a longer term focus and a desire for 
political leverage. This may, in turn, give them less interest in squeezing labour for short term 
gain. Many SWFs remain committed to securing resources and knowledge, an agenda which 
transcends traditional concerns around profitability (Wojcik, 2012:363; Lenihan, 2013). The 
latter includes investments in the automotive, military and aerospace sectors (Wojcik, 
2012:363), sectors founded on committed workforce, whose combined capabilities represent 
a unique source of competitive advantage (Chandler & McEvoy, 2000).  
 Finally, as state actors, SWFs do provide an implicit guarantee to creditors of firms 
they invest in, and appear to have a similar impact on creditor behaviour to direct state 
investment by the national government in question (Bertoni & Lugo. 2014: 34).  As SWFs 
tend to be longer-term investors, they may have interest in promoting more cooperative work 
and employment relations policies, promoting lower turnover and more incremental skills 
development (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a); this may relieve short-termist pressures on 
managers, and make for greater organizational stability and security for employees.   In other 
words, managers would be under less pressure to meet short-termist shareholder pressures, 
and be able to nurture the collective capabilities dimension of strategic agility. This would 
encompass HR policies based around development and cooperation, and accumulated 
knowledge and understanding, rather than numerical flexibility.   
 However, to maximise returns (for example, in response to domestic political 
pressures or financial pressures from their country of origin), SWFs may force organizational 
restructuring. Research conducted in the EU suggests that this may indeed be happening 
(ibid.). Balin (2010:1) argues that a greater emphasis on short term returns, given increased 
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scrutiny popular of parent governments in the aftermath of the financial crisis may result in a 
change in managerially strategies (c.f. Bernstein et al., 2013:220); arguably, this might force 
labour standards down, and lead to a loss of accumulated capabilities. Some high profile 
cases of SWF takeovers have been marked by job cuts and transfers of workers to positions 
with reduced pay or security of tenure (Gospel et al., 2011:281). As such pressures may 
mount during times when the country of origin is facing economic difficulties, this may mean 
that SWFs move from a contributor to financial stability to one worsening any financial 
instability in the global economy (Park & van der Hoorn, 2016). Bertoni and Lugo (2014:22) 
suggest that the transition from market to partial state ownership may make for organizational 
instabilities, in turn making things more difficult for stakeholders. Gospel and Pendleton 
(2014a) explicitly explore the relationship between SWF ownership and work and 
employment outcomes, and compare this with other “new investor” categories, such as 
private equity and hedge funds.  They suggest that in lightly regulated liberal markets, SWFs 
may have more room to push for more instrumentalist work and employment relations 
(Gospel & Pendleton 2014b).    This leads to proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3: Institutional arrangements in SWF countries of origin and domicile 
will affect the relative emphasis on short-term returns as opposed to  the longer term; the 
latter will be associated with more cooperative HR policies, reinforcing existing cognitive 
capabilities, which will enhance strategic agility. 
8. Examples of SWFs  
 Reflecting the multiplicity of institutional conditions in which they are embedded, 
SWFs are very diverse. As Cohen (2009:715) notes, SWFs differ greatly in propensity for 
risk taking, relative transparency and governance and sophistication. At the same time, 
Chwieroth (2014:1) argues that SWFs tend to follow their peers, with more established SWFs 
tending to follow more established ones. As a number of emerging market ones have 
increasingly shunned intermediation, and sought direct investments (and access to knowledge 
in strategic industries), it is perhaps hardly surprising that the Norwegian SWF, with its 
continued large scale usage of fund managers in the UK and US is upheld as an example of 
best practice (Wojcik, 2012:364).  However, this enthusiasm has masked some nuances: the 
Norwegian SWF has, for example, always tended to shun private equity (Bernstein et al., 
2013:225). Political controversies have resulted in considerable pressure on China’s SWF to 
make greater use of third party fund managers; the response of the fund has been partial (Sun 
et al., 2014:660), but may be prompted by a desire to diversify risk (Miao & Liyan, 2011). 
 Given the difficulty of generalizing SWFs as one category, it is useful to review 
different types of SWFs in order to understand the different ways in which they may affect 
labour in line with our theoretical Propositions. We provide three examples below from the 
developing, monarchial petrostates of Middle East and Brunei, Norway, and China (see Table 
2).   
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Insert Table 2 Here >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
 
8.1. Developing Monarchial Petrostate SWFs - The Middle East and Brunei 
 
 Dixon and Monck (2012) note that the Middle Eastern petrostates are rentier states, in 
that oil revenues generated by a few free the government from having to significantly tax the 
population at large, reducing pressures for accountability. Again, the rents accruing mean that 
the rentier state is an effective position to bribe sectors of the population and repress 
opposition (ibid.). Whilst the accumulation of a rentier state’s SWF may prop up the 
government, the prospect of higher returns and political clout may deepen and extend the 
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rentier state’s power and resources (ibid).  At the same time, as Clark (2008) notes, when 
freed from due scrutiny, such funds may be sheltered from any poor performance. So long as 
the SWF helps secure stability and increase the clout of the government home and abroad, the 
rentier state government is likely to be satisfied with the SWF’s performance (Dixon & 
Monk, 2012).   Hence, investment strategies may be arm’s length, and often via financial 
intermediaries, with the SWF having limited interest in how target firms are actually run on a 
day to day basis (ibid.). 
 According to the SWF Institute (2014), the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is the 
second largest SWFs with an estimated USD 773 billion in assets. Jory et al. (2010) argue 
that it is relatively unusual in that it has a track record of investing in joint ventures and 
private equity deals. The Kuwait Investment Authority, the sixth-largest SWF with USD 410 
billion in assets (SWF Institute 2014) is very opaque, and, Dixon and Monk (2012:111) 
argue, “it is hard to view it as anything but a tool of the ruling elite”.  The Brunei Investment 
Agency is seen as the least transparent of all SWFs, with the assets effectively belonging to 
the Sultan personally (ibid.:111).   
 In looking at the case of Dubai World’s acquisition of P&O, Gospel et al. (2011:285) 
note that this appears to be a strategic investment, rather than a commercial proposition.  
However, Gospel and Pendleton (2014a, 2014b) found that, in this instance, the investment 
was followed by a deterioration in pension provisions and employee representation.  In other 
words, the investment was followed by the adoption of more hardline HR policies, and it may 
be that, in the case of significant SWF holdings, this is more the rule than the exception 
(ibid.). As pensions represent a form of deferred pay, a reduction of benefits will undermine 
the basis of the employment contract; in turn, employees are likely to see the firm in more 
instrumental terms, and be reluctant to invest in developing their organization specific (as 
adverse to externally marketable) human capital (Dixon & Monk, 2012); hence, this may 
undermine both the behavioral and capabilities dimensions of strategic agility. 
 However, as we suggest in Proposition 1, the effect of many SWF investments may be 
more limited, given that most involve minority shareholding (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a).  
The above-mentioned takeover by Dubai World does not appear to have been marked by any 
other negative effect in HR practice or in job shedding (ibid.:286).  By the late 2000s, both 
funds had been a lot more aggressive in taking larger stakes, including in the financial 
services industry and real estate in the US and UK (Karake-Shalhoub, 2008). 
 However, since the 2008- financial crisis, the focus of the Gulf SWFs has shifted 
somewhat, with a greater focus on German industrial firms; the focus here appears to be in 
reinforcing proven managerial models and organizational capabilities (Haberly, 2013).  It 
also affected the relative size of different monarchical SWFs. For example, the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority emerged less affected by the crisis than, say, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi 
(Cohen, 2009).   This may also have forced a shift in orientation of the Gulf Funds. Losses 
racked up in financial services investments and through dealings with financial intermediaries 
have appeared to have driven a greater focus on more orthodox organizations who base their 
profits on conventional economic activities (Haberly, 2013:293). In turn, this has helped 
German industrial firms - including in the automotive sector - weather the stresses of 
financial restructuring, and reduce the risks of hostile takeovers (Haberly, 2013:293; 
Mietzner & Schiereck, 2011). Traditionally, patient ownership has been a feature of the 
German model, complementary with, and reinforcing stable employment and incremental 
organization specific skills development, and according employees significant say in the 
production process (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Brewster et al., 2012).   Although a large 
proportion of the literature on dynamic capabilities has focused on ‘light’ or agile 
organizations (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009), able to rapidly respond to the demands of 
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evangelical managers driven by the need to maximize shareholder value, the strategic agility 
of the great German industrial firms (and their Japanese counterparts) is often 
underestimated.  Such firms are able to rapidly adjust the process and the scope of 
production, innovate, and cope with the proliferation of lower cost producers from abroad, 
through continuous enhancement of quality, and the refinement and operationalization of 
technological advances; central to this agility are human resources, and the nurturing of 
desirable behaviors and skills through mutual commitment (ibid.). 
 Haberly (2013:304) notes that by 2007, the cross shareholding that characterized large 
German firms had largely disappeared, undermining one of the pillars of the German model, 
encompassing cooperative HR policies, and the above-mentioned high levels of mutual 
commitment between employers and employees. SWF investments, Haberly argues, have 
helped bolster the German model, through access to new types of patient capital, 
supplementing expansionist German family owned firms (ibid.; c.f. Mietzner & Schiereck, 
2011). Indeed, Haberly argues that Gulf SWFs have become “trustworthy and supportive 
white knights to German firms” (Haberly, 2013:307); indeed, the 9.1% stake in Daimler in 
2009 by Aabar (an Abu Dhabian SWF) was matched by commitment to be involved in 
Daimler “as long as Abu Dhabi exists” (Haberly, 2013:309).  However, a limit of this 
argument is that declining oil reserves may pose great domestic pressure on Gulf 
governments in the future; the relatively low oil and gas prices of late 2015 and early 2016 
has meant that significant inroads have been made into the Saudi SWF in particular.   A 
broader decline of the Gulf SWFs may force a premature liquidation of key investments, and 
casting fresh doubt over the German patient ownership model, and firms reliant on patient 
investor capital elsewhere in the world.  In terms of Propositions 2 and 3, it could be argued 
that Gulf SWFs may reinforce what is seen as acceptable managerial behavior, and dominant 
national HR modes of practice in target markets, rather than imparting significant country of 
origin effects, deepening existing bases of strategic agility (or, potentially worsening areas 
where there are, typically, significant shortfalls). 
 
8.2. An Ethical SWF - Norway 
 Norway’s SWF has been concerned with securing and transferring a proportion of 
present oil wealth for future generations, helping future pension liabilities for an ageing 
population, and promoting Norwegian values (Dixon & Monk, 2012: 114). The Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global possibly the largest SWF in the world, with a market value 
of NOK 5,038 billion in 2013. In 2014, the SWF Institute (2014) estimated its holdings at 
USD 893 billion, making it the largest in asset size. It held an average ownership stake of 
1.3% globally and 2.5% in Europe. In 2013, it invested 61.7% in equities, 37.3% in bonds 
and 1% in real estate (Norwegian Ministry of Finance/NMF, 2014). It is restricted to 5% 
holding maximum in a company, limiting its influence in corporate affairs, in addition to 
their restrictions on unethical investments (Caner & Grennes, 2010: 602).  
 Norway is the fifth-biggest oil exporter and the Fund was founded in the 1990s with 
the mission of saving the country’s finite petroleum wealth for future generations and to 
stabilize the implications of oil price fluctuations. Determined by Norway’s finance ministry, 
it started out investing in government bonds. Over time, it has been allowed to buy up to 40% 
and since 2007 60% of shares but never more than 10 per cent of one company. In 2008 the 
Fund was permitted to buy shares in companies in emerging markets and infrastructure assets 
and real estate. The Fund’s investment strategy has been described as mainly passive, as it 
aims to hold a portion of companies world-wide, so that it “can over time reap a return close 
to the overall return in global capital markets” (NMF, 2014: 12). Unlike most Asian SWFs, it 
is not permitted to invest at home (Alm, 2012: 184; Truman, 2011).  
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 While many sovereign wealth funds do not disclose their results, Norway considers 
transparency as a prerequisite for ensuring widespread confidence in the management of the 
Fund. The Fund publishes quarterly reports of its activities, detailed annual reports including 
management performance and an annual list of all investments, allowing outsiders to 
objectively evaluate its practices (Caner & Grennes, 2013). The Fund faced close public 
scrutiny such as when it suffered a negative return of 23% in just one year after the onset of 
the financial crisis, following on years of good performance (ibid.). 
 The Fund stands out in having the mandate to act as a responsible investor. The Fund 
is managed on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, which, in line with its 
responsible investment strategy, has adopted ethical guidelines for asset management which 
are overseen by the Ethics Council. This stipulates the integration of environmental, social 
and corporate governance considerations in the investment activities, through environment-
related investments, research and analysis, active ownership, as well as divestment from and 
exclusion of companies on ethical grounds.  
 In terms of active ownership, the mandate from the Ministry stipulates that active 
ownership shall be based on the UN Global Compact, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which are voluntary 
recommendations promoting good corporate governance expectations and responsible 
corporate environmental and social practices. The Fund’s six strategic areas of ownership 
priorities are: equal treatment of shareholders; roles and responsibilities of the board; well-
functioning financial markets; children’s rights; climate change; and water management 
(NMF 2013). Even though ownership in each individual company is low with an average of 
1.3% of shares, the Fund is amongst the main shareholders of a number of companies, which 
places it in a strategic position influence markets and individual companies. In 2013, the 
Norwegian Central Bank managing the Fund reported voting in 9,583 general meetings, 
submitting four and voting on 239 shareholder proposals on environmental and social issues. 
In the same year, over 2,304 meetings were held between fund representatives and company 
executives and 77 meetings with the chairperson of the board of companies.  
 Furthermore, the Fund uses divestment to pursue its ethical policy. The Norwegian 
Ethics Council determines which companies should be excluded, such if they produce certain 
products, such as tobacco, certain weapons or sell military material to specific states. As of 
2013, such product-based exclusion affected 40 companies including Lockheed Martin, 
EADS, Boeing, Altria Group, British American Tobacco or Philip Morris. Companies may 
also be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that they may contribute to, or are 
responsible for, grossly unethical activities, including systematic human rights violations, 
such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour 
and other child exploitation, severe environmental damage or gross corruption. Conduct-
based exclusions affected 21 companies, including Barrick Gold and Rio Tinto for severe 
environmental damage and Walmart for human rights violations centering on labor standards. 
In 2014, the Fund announced to drop its investments in coal, tar sands and palm oil sectors.  
 While the Fund claims it is “not a foreign-policy tool,” its exclusion principles have 
created debate. Most notably, the Fund’s exit from Walmart (followed by Sweden’s four 
national pension funds and the Netherlands’ PGGM pension fund) triggered off a diplomatic 
row, with the US ambassador to Norway accusing the fund of passing a national judgment on 
a single company (Bernstein et al., 2013: 235). As exposed through a WikiLeaked cable 
(Aftenposten, 2011), U.S. diplomats have also grown concerned that the Fund’s ethical 
policy disproportionately impacted U.S. corporations, particularly political influential arms 
manufacturers and those characterized by hardline HR policies.    
 What are the likely consequences of the Fund’s activities for strategic agility and 
HRM?   Firstly, the small size of holdings means that the Fund is unlikely to have much 
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impact on day-to-day people management.  However, the ability and willingness to exit firms 
where it has doubts over managerial policies and directions, means that firms have to temper 
their behavior.  This is unlikely either to drive higher value added HR policies, or, in doing 
so, contribute to greater strategic agility in target firms.  However, there is evidence from the 
UK that investments by the Fund are associated with a reduced willingness to shed labor by 
target firms (Baric et al., 2014).  In turn, this would provide incentives for workers to develop 
their organization specific human capital, enhancing the capabilities dimension of strategic 
agility.  Secondly, this means that not only are certain industries are shunned, but also supply 
chain policies will be closely scrutinized; the latter will make it more difficult for firms to 
found their competitiveness on aggressive cost cutting, and, hence, will have more incentives 
to take their human assets more seriously; in turn, this will, ultimately, once more, impact the 
behavioral and capabilities dimensions of strategic agility. These arguments are in line with 
our Proposition 1 that links SWF investments with a longer term view in firms, deepening the 
basis of strategic agility. 
 Nonetheless, based on the existing evidence, and in terms of Proposition 2, it can be 
argued that NGPF-G will narrow the bounds of what constitutes acceptable managerial 
behavior in terms of HR policy and practice, and, hence, enhance the type of strategic agility 
founded on greater employer-employee interdependence  In terms of proposition 3, it could 
be argued that the NGPF-G may impart significant country of origin effects,  diluting the 
country of investment effects on HR practice in target firms, and hence, the capacity for 
strategic agility. 
 
8.3. Manufacturing Export Founded SWF - China 
 The China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established in 2007 as a ministry-level 
state owned enterprise, with the formal aim of diversifying foreign exchange holdings and 
raising the income from investments (Zhang & He, 2009). According to the SWF Institute, 
CIC is the fourth largest SWF with USD 652.7 billion in assets behind Norway, UAE and 
Saudi Arabia (at least until the latter’s recent [2016] decline). Alberola and Serena (2008: 
329) characterize the Corporation as the epitome of a compromise between net importing and 
exporting countries, with the US, above all, being reliant on inflows from bodies such as the 
Corporation to finance worsening trade deficits.  
 The CIC is unusual among SWFs in that it was founded through it borrowing special 
Chinese government bonds, for which it has to pay interest, a founding “original sin”, which 
makes it susceptible pressures to service this interest, as well as the political concerns of 
government, given it is staffed with government officials (Zhang & He, 2009:109). It has 
been particularly controversial owing to the close relationship between the Chinese state 
(Dixon & Monk, 2012:104). Dixon and Monk (2012: 111) argue that it is an example of a 
productivist SWF, which may be defined as being primarily concerned with promoting the 
domestic political economy and increasing its influence in global production networks. CIC 
investments initially looked at domestic firms, and overseas financial services firms, such as 
Blackstone (Zhang & He, 2009). Perhaps on account of large losses racked up in its dealings 
with Blackstone and other financial intermediaries (Datz, 2009:663; Anderlini, 2014), it 
gradually shifted focus to direct investments in firms, including in the mining and energy 
sectors, including in the developing world, and often supplementing investments by Chinese 
state owned enterprises in the same firms (Dixon & Monck, 2012:112; Wu et al., 2012; 
Anderlini, 2014).  In addition to seeking energy security, in the case of emerging markets, 
there is evidence to suggest that Chinese investments have been particularly geared towards 
mineral resource seeking and, recently, agricultural land (Wu et al., 2012:353; Anderlini, 
2014).  In the case of Africa, Chinese investments have been marked by the preferential 
employment of Chinese nationals, even in unskilled positions (Negi, 2008). As many 
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emerging governments are heavily dependent on such investments - particularly as Chinese 
investors typically do not deploy as conservative costing models as Western mining firms, 
meaning that more marginal mines are likely to be opened or stay open (Mohan & Power, 
2008) - this means that efforts to regulate incoming Chinese labour have been limited or 
ineffectual. On the one hand, this allows for an inflow of human capital, at least as far as 
skilled workers are concerned; target firms may be better equipped to cope with external 
environmental challenges through stronger internal capabilities It may also make for a more 
closely knit organizational culture, reinforcing the behavioral dimensions of strategic agility.  
On the other hand, this has led to a further diminishment in job opportunities for locals (albeit 
that, in many instances, marginal mines would otherwise have closed), and increased 
horizontal tensions between different ethnic categories of labour (Negi, 2008).  In other 
words, remaining African workers may become alienated, and be reluctant to support new 
managerial agendas.  In turn, this may feed into populist politics, and at worst, ethnic based 
conflicts (Negi, 2008).   However, as the literature on institutional complexity alerts us 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2013), firms will still be affected by historically embedded 
institutional logics; there is empirical evidence that Chinese firms in Africa are both under 
pressure to, and may materially benefit from, developing shared languages of understanding, 
given embedded overlaps in African and Chinese values (Xing et al., 2016). This may allow 
for the development of strategic agility that builds on the synergy of strengths conferred from 
each national context. 
 In the case of mature economies, investments have been also motivated by knowledge 
seeking (Mackinnon & Powell, 2010:168-170). On the one hand, this may again make for 
much needed investment in firms which would otherwise have experienced difficulties, 
helping secure jobs, and retain skill sets and knowledge relevant to particular industries 
(Epstein & Rose, 2009).   In other words, this may help husband existing capabilities, 
enabling firms to retain and develop this dimension of strategic agility, even in difficult 
times.  On the other hand, this may lead to the hollowing out of organizations, with a core 
pool of technical skills being retained, and the bulk of production shifted to China, leading to 
a loss of good jobs in the country of investment, and, even, knowledge stripping (Mackinnon 
& Powell, 2010). The latter would entail a process where the existing knowledge base, skills 
and capabilities are recorded, and then disseminated to other organizations in China, 
ultimately leading to the diminishment of the behavioral and behavioral foundations of 
strategic agility. 
 Finally, unlike most of the SWFs, the bulk of the CICs investments (some 81.5 $bn) 
are domestic, outweighing the fund’s albeit very substantial overseas investments (42.6 $bn) 
(Megginson, 2013:545). On the one hand, this may provide key sources of developmental 
capital to domestic firms (Aberola & Serena, 2008: 315).  On the other hand, a primary 
concern of the Chinese government has been domestic political stability, and this has 
encompassed the support and propping up of uncompetitive manufacturing firms producing 
low value added low cost goods (Zhang & He, 2009); structural barriers to exist and the 
continued ability to access capital, despite organizational failings, may alleviate pressures to 
become strategically agile, and devise and roll out new technical or HR strategies to enhance 
competitiveness. 
 In terms of Proposition 2, it could be argued that CIC investment may shift the 
governing norms of managerial behavior; in the developing world, this may represent a move 
from traditional recruitment strategies based on local informal networks of support, towards 
the importation of labor from China.  This may either reduce the human basis of strategic 
agility through the loss of intra-organizational local knowledge, or enhance it through new 
skills and greater opportunities for cross cultural dialogue.  In terms of Proposition 3, it could 
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be argued that CIC investment may be geared to the capture and transfer of existing 
capabilities, rather than the further development of them.   
 As Table 2 and our case discussion clearly indicate, SWFs represent a heterogeneous 
population of investment institutions that differ in terms of their source of financial resources, 
overall objectives and governance characteristics including their transparency, and in terms 
of their consequences for firms and their strategic agility, and HR policies and practices.  
 
9. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Although the three SWFs we discussed have similarities in terms of their overall 
objectives aimed at preservation and enhancement national wealth, they are distinctively 
different in terms of possible impacts on labor and HR in host economies. For example, the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway considers employees as a key group of stakeholders 
whose interests should be taken into account when making investment decisions; this appears 
to feed through to a reduced willingness to shed labor, which may husband and mature the 
capabilities and behavioral dimensions of strategic agility (Baric et al., 2014). On the other 
end of spectrum is China Investment Corporation who is much less perceptive to employment 
concerns and demands of organized labour. However, in support of parent government 
concern with domestic political stability, this may provide continued access to capital for 
underperforming firms without necessitating changes in managerial strategy in the latter; in 
other words, no matter how challenging the external environment, CIC investments in 
domestic firms may reduce the need for strategic agility, with potentially serious long term 
consequences. Although Abu Dhabi Investment Authority may be currently passive in terms 
of engaging with portfolio companies, the mounting pressures to focus on the short-term 
financial performance may move this SWF towards the CIC’s end of spectrum in the future. 
More broadly speaking, there is evidence that Gulf SWFs have been willing to supply patient 
capital to incrementally innovative manufacturing firms (Haberly, 2013), shoring up the 
behavioral and capabilities dimensions of strategic agility.  Our case analysis and Table 2 
indicate that researchers need to develop a more holistic, dynamic perspective on the specific 
SWFs and their economic impact. 
 In this paper we discuss four channels through which SWF affects HR strategies 
employees around the world. First, SWFs affect macroeconomic conditions, and hence 
affects labour markets.  Second, there is interplay between SWF investment and institutional 
and legal conditions, which in turn affects HR policies and standards in home and host 
countries. Finally, SWFs directly impact employees in terms of their influence on the 
governance of companies in which they invest, and their relative interest in promoting 
different forms of strategic agility; the primary focus of this article has been on the latter, and 
how SWF investments may enhance the capabilities, behavioral and contextual dimensions of 
strategic agility through people.  
 The direct implications from SWF investment for HR strategies and strategic agility 
are particularly understudied and warrant greater scrutiny, although this review of existing 
research evidence would suggest they are potentially far reaching. Further empirical analyses 
that link SWF investment to macroeconomic and labor market conditions are needed; the 
latter will directly impact on the contextual dimensions of strategic agility (Doz & Kosonen 
2008; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Weber & Tarba, 2010).  Similarly, studies that examine 
the governance structures and political influences on SWFs and the related labour outcomes 
for SWF investees domestically and cross-border would provide much insight the welfare 
implications of SWF investment, and, the internal organizational consequences of this (Johan 
et al., 2013; Knill et al., 2012). 
 Currently, there are tremendous global imbalances between net exporting and net 
importing nations. Whilst it would be incorrect to assume the circuits of global capital are 
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perfectly closed, to a large extent, balance of payments deficits were corrected by the inflow 
of credit from exporting nations. The rise of SWFs fundamentally changes this relationship 
from an arm’s length credit supplying one, to one that has a stronger governance component.  
SWFs invest not only to ensure good and/or predictable returns.  However, in their activities, 
they gain leverage not only directly over the firms they invest in, but also may impact on the 
behavior of firms seeking investment, and indeed, the wider political economy of the country 
of domicile.  We should not assume that the decisions guiding SWFs are mechanistic or 
uniform. By the same manner, the rise of SWFs has infused the circuits of capital, and 
ultimately the orientation of the firm, with a stronger element of politics and power (Fotak et 
al., 2016).   
 However, those affected by the choices of SWFs will, first of all, be stakeholders in 
firms with SWF holdings, including workers. What this review has highlighted is the 
diversity of this impact, which can range from expectations of higher labour standards, 
greater job security and more ethical corporate behaviour (Norway), to job creation for parent 
country nationals at the expense of locals (CIC investments in Africa).   The former may 
reinforce the behavioral and capabilities dimensions of strategic agility (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009). Although the latter may promote uniformity organizational culture and 
desired patters of behavior – and, hence, agility (Doz & Kosonen 2008; Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009) – it may also lead to a loss of existing capabilities (even if informal, and 
particularly hard to quantify).   It may further lead to political tensions, undermining the 
contextual basis of strategic agility (Weber & Tarba, 2010).   
Further research linking SWFs to HR outcomes would be of much interest to 
academics, practitioners and policymakers alike.  Above all, what this paper highlights is that 
SWF investments may have profound consequences for HR practice. Depending on 
institutional arrangements in home and host country, relative concern for ethics, and relative 
pressures for short term returns and the securing of technological expertise, the relative 
implications for, and type of strategic agility conferred, may vary. To establish legitimacy, 
SWFs may adopt a hands-off approach, whilst providing new capital for investment, in turn, 
allowing managers and employees more room to build agility through capabilities and in 
nurturing particular patterns of behaviour (Gospel et al., 2011).  However, both long- and 
short-termist investment horizons may have direct consequences. In the case of the former, 
this may encompass a stronger emphasis on security and continuity, whilst providing the 
basis in terms of skills and mutual commitment for agility. In the case of the latter, this may 
result in a primary focus on numerical and financial flexibility making for a closer 
articulation between contextual and organizational trends, which may enable the firm to 
respond quicker to external shocks, but debilitating the behavioural and capabilities 
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Table 1: Sovereign Wealth Fund Ranking – Top 15 
 










Norway Government Pension Fund 
Global 
893 1990 Oil 10 
UAE – Abu 
Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
773 1976 Oil  5 
Saudi 
Arabia 
SAMA Foreign Holdings 757.2 n/a Oil 4 
China China Investment Corporation  652.7 2007 Non-
commodity 
7 
China SAFE Investment Company  567.9* 1997 Non-
commodity 
4 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 410 1953 Oil 6 
China – 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Monetary 









China National Social Security Fund 201.6 2000 Non-
commodity 
5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 177 1974 Non-
commodity 
10 
Quatar Quatar Investment Authority 170 2005 Oil & Gas 5 
Australia Australia Future Fund 95 2006 Non-
commodity 
10 
UAE – Abu 
Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council 90 2007 Oil n/a 
Russia National Welfare Fund 88 2008 Oil 5 
Russia Reserve Fund 86.4 2008 Oil 5 
* Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
** Estimate figure. 




Table 2: Typology of sovereign wealth funds  
 
Type of SWF II (‘Monarchical’) I (‘Ethical’) III (‘Manufacturing’) 
Example Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
Government Pension 









Trade surplus in 
manufactured goods 
Governance Autocratic Democratic, Separate 









saving, ensure greater 
economic stability and 
improve overall public 
welfare 
Stabilize currency 








Diffusion of human 
rights and ethical 
values 
Secure access to foreign 





Ownership Divestment and 










owners” but under 
increasing pressure for 
short-term gains 
Divests from 
companies with worst 
labour practices, such 







country of domicile. May 
provide capital to support 
Coordinated Market 
patient investor models, 
forging alliances with 
national investors, who 
benefit from the 
complementarities 
flowing from cooperative 
HR paradigms, centring 
on high levels of co-
determination and 
interdependence.  In 
LMEs, may similarly seek 
to  benefit from the ability 
to more readily adjust 
workforce sizes and 
pensions. 
May promote greater 
interdependence with 
employees through 
reducing the propensity 
to make redundancies. 
In developing world, 
the diffusion of country 
of origin HR practices 
may be facilitated by 
the substitution of labor 
with Chinese nationals. 
In developed world, 
may seek to harness 
firm specific skills and 
capabilities, but 
ultimately make them 
dispensible through 
replication and 
diffusion back to the 
country of origin.  
However, complex and 
competing institutional 




* Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
